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Introduction
 This presentation focuses on the Space Shuttle Primary Avionics 
Software System (PASS) and the people who developed and 
maintained this system.  
 One theme is to provide quantitative data on software quality and 
reliability over a 30 year period
 Consistent data relates to “code break” discrepancies
 Requirements were supplied from external sources
 Requirement inspections and measurements not 
implemented until later, beginning in 1985
 Second theme is to focus on the people and organization of PASS           
 Many individuals have supported the PASS project over the 
entire period while transitioning from company to company 
and contract to contract   
 Major events and transitions have impacted morale (both 
positively and negatively) across the life of the project
Page 2
8/11/2010
Introduction
 Including Approach and Landing Tests, PASS project  has run from 1974
 Process development started at beginning of project
D t il d t i PASS lit d li bilit i t i d i e a e  me r cs on  process, qua y, an  re a y s con a ne  n a 
separate companion presentation 
 Space Shuttle Program Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) 
S L Q lit & R li bilit D tuccess egacy – ua y  e a y a a
 This companion presentation presents an “apples to apples” 
comparison of quality and reliability of PASS from STS-1 to present
 Page 6 shows the number of Product Discrepancy Reports (DRs) flown  
 Vast Majority of Product DRs introduced prior to STS-5
424 PASS Prod ct DRs fle on STS 5 mission   u   w  -  
 DRs unknown at the time of the flight, but discovered over the 
years since
 Today there is a 60 % probability that a newly found PASS Product DR 
was introduced on STS-5 or earlier.
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Introduction
 Quality Measures
 Errors counted in three periods
 Errors found by Inspection and Development Test Pre Build       -  
(prior to being placed under project configuration control)
 Process DRs found Post Build until a milestone called 
Software Readiness Review (SRR) for the first flight off that          
increment; typically occurs approximately 4 weeks prior to 
flight
 Product DRs found from SRR of first flight until end of 
program   
 Subset of Product DRs are those which occur in either 
terminal countdown or in flight, called in-flight DRs
 Additional special category of DRs are called Released 
Severity 1 DRs.  These may be process or product DRs.  These 
are DRs that could cause loss of crew or vehicle that are 
l d t fi ld it h th Sh ttl Mi i Si l tre ease  o any e  s e suc  as e u e ss on mu a or 
(SMS), the vehicle at KSC, or the Shuttle Avionics Integration 
Lab (SAIL).
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Introduction
 Quality Measures
 Pre-build Detection Effectiveness (Inspection Plus Development 
Test) 
 Errors found by Inspection and Development Test Pre-Build 
(prior to being placed under project configuration control) 
divided by total errors   
 Verification Effectiveness 
 Process DRs divided by (Process DRs plus Product DRs)
 Product Error Rate 
 Product DRs divided by new, changed, deleted source lines of 
code Includes only non comment source lines of code.    -     .
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Number Of Latent Unknown Product DRs Flown
Product DRs that existed on a flown system, but were unknown at the 
time of the flight .  Discovered up to 25 years later.
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Introduction
 Common themes running through lifecycle periods
 Improvements through process enhancements
 Improvements through automation
 Defect removal following identification of significant process 
escapes
 Impact of workforce instability
 Early evaluator, adopter, and adapter of state-of-the-art software 
engineering innovations
 A significant contributor to the success of the PASS FSW organization 
has been the support of the NASA software customers that have 
consistently valued quality and supported reasonable implementation 
schedules.  NASA has also supported maintaining critical skill staffing.
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Dedication To Safety
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Dedication To Safety
 Developing complex human-rated flight software is a major technical 
challenge.
 Perfection required to achieve the desired level of safety
 Extremely difficult to accomplish, but can be aggressively        
pursued
 Keys to the pursuit of perfection
 Principles of Providing High Reliability Software
 Continuous Process Improvement
 Defect Elimination Process
Page 9
8/11/2010
Principles of Providing High Reliability Software
 Safety certification is currently based on process adherence rather 
than product.
 Assumption is that a known controlled repeatable process will result    , ,     
in a product of known quality.
 Process executed by personnel that are committed to safety and skilled 
relative to processes system architecture and specialized software  ,  ,    
requirements.
 Team skills and workload closely monitored by management to prevent 
over commitment that could result in quality breakdowns.
 Use “trusted” tools to develop, build, release and maintain the software.
 Use measurements to continuously assess the health of both the process 
and the product.
 Relationship between quality and reliability must be established for each 
software version and statistically demonstrated for the required 
operational profiles.
 Quality must be built into the software, at a known level, rather than 
adding the quality after development.
 You cannot test quality into software
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Examples Of Continuous Process Improvement
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Defect Elimination Process
Steps performed
1. Remove defect
2. Remove root cause of defect
3. Eliminate process escape deficiency
4. Search/analyze product for other, similar escapes
Root Cause2 Defect Escaped
Detection?
3
Process
Element
A
Process
Element
B
Process
Element
C
Process
Element
D
Product
Similar Additional
Undetected Defects
4DefectIntroduced
Original Defect
 
1Process Improvement Continuously Achieved
By Performing Feedback Steps 2 and 3
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Space Shuttle Flight Software 
Period Themes
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Quantitative Anchors For Following Discussions
 The following pages shows the succession of releases that implemented 
major capabilities into the PASS FSW along with key quality / reliability 
measures.
 Space Shuttle Flight Software Period Themes (page 15)
 PASS FSW History divided into periods with consistent 
environments
 PASS FSW Releases (page 16)
 Note: No flights using releases OI 3 OI 7C and OI 8A      - , - ,  -
 Space Shuttle Flight Rate and Key Flights (page 17)
 Number of Known PASS FSW Product DRs Flown (page 6)
 Peak of 425 Product DRs (unknown at the time) flown on STS-5
 No Product DRs discovered since 11/14/2008
 Reliability of PASS FSW During Missions (page 18)
 From MTBF of 7 Flight Days between in-flight DRs on STS-1
 To MTBF of 294 Flight Days between in-flight DRs on STS-134
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Space Shuttle Flight Software Period Themes
Years Theme Events
1978-1982 Initial System Development Supports Incrementally / STS-1 to STS-5 
Many Major Capabilities
1983-1985 Pre-Challenger Operations Incremental Development / Reductions in Staff during 
1985
1986-1988 Post-Challenger, Return to Flight Challenger Accident / PASS FSW Revalidation / 
Return to Flight
1989-1993 Process Optimization and Stability CMM Level 5 / GPC Memory/Speed Upgrade
Skilled, Stable Workforce
1994 1997 Transition To Loral / Lockheed Workforce Instability / OI 25 PTI DR Escapes-      
Martin 
   -    
Process Change / GPS Upgrade
1998-2002 Transition to United Space Alliance Restore Workforce Stability / Influx Of New Personnel
2003-2005 Post-Columbia / Return-To-Flight Cockpit Avionics Upgrade / Columbia Accident / 
Return to Flight
2006-2008 Shuttle Ending, OI Development OI-32, OI-33, OI-34 / Display Upgrades evolved From 
CAU / CMMI Level 5 November 2006       
2009-2011 Shuttle Ending, Skills Maintenance Skills Maintenance / Reductions-In-Workforce
CMMI Level 5 in September 2009
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PASS FSW Development History
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Key Space Shuttle Flight(s) ?
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MTBF, Flight Days Between In-Flight DRs
Page 18
8/11/2010
Initial PASS OFT Development    
Through STS-5 (1978 – 1982)   
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Characteristics Of Period (1978 – 1982)
 It is not possible to do this period justice given the significance of the 
accomplishment (developing software for STS-1 through STS-5) and 
th h ll f d de c a enges ace  an  overcame. 
 PASS history has been extensively documented in other reports and 
articles
 Reference:
 http://history.nasa.gov/computers/Ch4-5.html
 Computers in Spaceflight: The NASA Experience, -
Chapter Four - Computers in the Space Shuttle 
Avionics System - Developing software for the space 
shuttle
 http://history.nasa.gov/computers/Source4.html
 Sources for the above references
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Characteristics Of Period (1978 – 1982)
 Major technical challenges in terms of infrastructure, programming 
languages, and requirements definition.
 Major challenges in terms of memory and CPU speed limitations of 
AP-101B
 Design/Code inspection conducted by Development Organization      
including Developer, Requirements Analyst, and Peer Programmer.
 No measurements on inspections available
 Rigorous testing program
 7 levels of testing prior to Configuration Inspection (CI)
 Integrated Avionics Verification in SAIL after each release
 24 Interim releases provided to field users prior to STS-1 over a 2 year 
period
 2764 Process DRs found prior to Software Readiness Review (SRR) for 
STS-1
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Space Events (1978 – 1982)
 Voyagers 1 & 2 Flybys of Jupiter & Saturn
 Skylab Deorbited 
 Interim Upper Stage (IUS) approved for Shuttle and later renamed to 
Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)
 First Space Shuttle Launch (STS-1)
 OFT-1 through OFT-4 Shuttle test flights
 Salyut-6 Space Station Deorbited
 Salyut-7 Space Station Launched
 Fi t t llit d l (STS 5)rs  sa e e ep oys -
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Initial Development (1978 – 1982)
Category Observation / Characteristics
S Of • Transition from ALT work to OFT developmentcope  
Development
      
• Expansion of orbit FSW capability post STS-1
• First Flight Capabilities
• Schedule driven heavy change request traffic ,    
• Early Systems Management / Payload Management 
Software
Category Observation / Characteristics  
Quality • Release 16 (STS-1) Product Error Rate = 0.8 DRs/KSLOC
• Release 18, 19 (STS-2, STS-5) Product Error Rate = 1.1 
DR /KSLOCs
• Verification Effectiveness defined as Process DRs / 
(Process DRs plus Product DRs)
• Release 16 (STS-1) at 91 % of DRs found by SRR
• Release 19 (STS-5) at 77 % of DRs found by SRR
• Early reliance on testing
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Initial Development (1978 – 1982)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Reliability • Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) values based on 
reliability modeling
• Three MTBF measures presented here.  
- Calendar Days Between Any Product DR     
• STS-1, 5.8 Calendar Days 
• STS-5, 7.3 Calendar Days
- Flight Days Between Any In-flight DR
• STS-1, 7.3 Flight Days
• STS-5, 9.1 Flight Days
- Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR1
(Estimated)
• STS-1, 327 Flights
• STS-5, 409 Flights
(1) Severity 1 DR is a DR that results in loss of crew and/or vehicle. Reference:  
Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR (Estimated) at risk level of 1 in 
approximately 1000 for STS-51L as a return-to-flight action for STS-26.
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Initial Development (1978 – 1982)
Category Observation / Characteristics
P d t DR 523 P d t DR i i t SRR f th tro uc  s •  ro uc  s rema n ng a   or ese sys ems
• STS-5 flew with 424 Product DRs (unknown at the time)1
present  
• In-flight DRs for STS-1 to STS-5: 
• 29 Total Flight Days
• Two DRs during terminal countdown    
• One DR during flight
• Released Severity 1 DRs
• STS-1 flew with 4 Severity 1 DRs
• One removed prior to STS-2
• Scenarios typically involved multiple SSME 
failures and contingency aborts
(1) Product DRs that existed on a flown system, but were unknown at the time of 
the flight; discovered up to 25 years later.
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Initial Development (1978 – 1982)
Category Observation / Characteristics
New Lessons Valid models in software test environment are critical  
Learned
•        
• Timing related hardware models need to include 
random variation similar to hardware characteristics
• Collect appropriate data during integrated hardware      
tests
• Multiple “apparently unrelated” changes can collectively 
produce unexpected erroneous consequences   
• Manual processes require continuous management 
oversight to insure rigorous analysis
• All possible scenarios must be identified, 
accommodated via design, and tested.
• Many scenarios-related problems have extremely 
small timing windows.  Very unlikely to detect during 
testing only.  Requires “Multi-Pass” analysis 
methods to insure identification.
• Proper initialization under all scenarios required.
Page 26
8/11/2010
Initial Development (1978 – 1982)
Category Observation / Characteristics
New Lessons Verification analyst participation in the pre build  
Learned
•      -  
inspection process significantly adds quality
• Prior to mid part of Release 19 (STS-5), the 
Verification analysts did not participate in      
design/code inspections.  However, they did 
participate in inspections of patches implemented 
on STS-1 due to the increased risk of patch         
implementation over source change.
• Assessment of the quality of the STS-1 patches 
versus the STS-2 source changes for the same DR 
and CR implementation resulted in the observation 
that the STS-1 patches were of higher quality.
• Following this conclusion, the pre-build design/code 
inspection process was modified to require 
participation of the Verification analyst.
Page 27
8/11/2010
SAMPLE PASS SEVERITY 1 DR CAUSAL MECHANISM
Mechanism:
Multi-Pass 
Scenario
Description:
A Multi-Pass function is one which 
requires code segment(s) to be 
executed multiple times before a
Application To Future
• One defense is to force the function 
to complete before the code 
accepts a change to the input     
function is completed where code 
logic paths are a function of multiple 
input variables which may change 
while the function execution is in 
      
variables
• If input variables are allowed to 
change, then the requirements may 
not allow for correct functioning ifprogress.       the scenario was not well analyzed.
• Insure Proper Design/Code 
Initialization for all input variable 
state transitions.   
Example:
• Command interconnect between 
Space Shuttle OMS fuel tanks and 
RCS jets during an abort to allow
Example Problems:
• Fuel system valves may be 
incorrectly configured such that no 
fuel can reach the RCS jets       
propellant dump to reduce weight.
• Additional failures occur, and the 
abort mode is changed.
     , 
resulting in loss of control due to 
lack of control authority.
• Coding construct (such as “Do-
Case”) may not be initialized• Command a “return to normal” 
interconnect (RCS jets supplied 
from RCS fuel tanks) prior to 
completion of prior interconnect.
     
properly.   In PASS in the 1980’s, 
this resulted in a “random” 
incorrect branch due to case 
number exceeding maximum case.
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Initial Development (1978 – 1982)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Staffing / Morale • Initial staffing in 1978  was a mix of new hires and 
experienced staff from Apollo
• Schedule pressure, significant overtime
• STS-1 launch was delayed several times due to 
technical challenges (TPS, MPS).   
• By the time of STS-1, the staffing was very experienced 
M l hi h• ora e was very g .
• Program was cutting edge technology
• IBM was a premier company in computer 
programming industry 
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Shuttle/FSW Reconfiguration 
 ALT
 FSW definition of the Downlist and I-Load reconfigurable data and 
tables/code were coded by hand    
 STS-1
 Recon data now defined in Level C cards from Rockwell/Downey
 FSW definition of the SM and I Load reconfigurable data and      -     
tables/code were generated by the SM preprocessor with 
workarounds coded by hand 
 SM reconfigurable table layout somewhat simple and straight 
forward in some cases
 Errors caused by inconsistent data and coding errors
 Downlist generated by a preprocessor (not sure if it was STS-1 or 
shortly thereafter) 
 STS-2 – STS-4
 Progression of SM Preprocessor/I-Load tools to automate table 
ti / digenera on co ng
 Errors due to immaturity of tools/consistency checking 
 Work in progress to categorize I-Loads for reconfiguration
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Pre-Challenger Accident  
Operations (1983 – 1985)  
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Characteristics Of Period (1983 – 1985)
 Major challenges in terms of adding functions and maintaining system in the face 
of memory and CPU speed limitations of AP-101B
 Issue with CPU speed resulted in the introduction of Severity 1 DR 56938
 SM/PL Software redesigned on STS-5 due to both memory and CPU issues 
adding payload support  
 Pre-Build Design/Code inspection conducted by FSW Organization including 
Developer, Requirements Analyst, Verification Analyst, and Peer Programmer.
 Measurements on inspections available, process effectiveness rapidly rising.
 In transition from manually generated vehicle and payload flight specific code to 
code generated by automated pre processors from reconfiguration databases    -    
 However, several errors introduced due to manual final load reconfiguration 
changes
 Staffing Transition from development to operations
 De-staffing by IBM in 1985 via placement on other projects
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Characteristics Of Period (1983 – 1985)
 Transitioned from long development time for releases into frequent 
Operational Increments with delta time between Configuration Inspections (CI) 
on the order of four months.  Net effect was reduced verification time per 
release
 Significant number of Product DR’s introduced in this period which are           
discovered in flight
 Product DR’s (newly introduced and latent from 1978 – 1982 period) affect 
mission objectives, three Product DRs patched during flight
 Additional Released Severity 1 DRs are discovered, creating concerns to (a) 
id f t i t d ti d (b) fi d i i i ti S it 1 DRavo  u ure n ro uc on an   n  any rema n ng ex s ng ever y  s
 Continued high demand for software CR changes with some risk of over-
commitment.
 Increasing late change traffic on OI’s (Over 50 % of the OI-7C content 
baselined post FACI)
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Space Events (1983 – 1985)
 First satellite retrieval (STS-41C)
 First Spacelab flight (STS-9)
 Centaur Upper Stage Funded for Shuttle Use
 First DOD flight (STS-51C)
 Challenger, Discovery and Atlantis Debuts
 9 Shuttle flights in CY1985
 Salyut-7 is extensively repaired after full breakdown
 Enterprise Fit-Tests at Vandenberg
 Spacelab
 Main Engine Control redesign
 Payload manifesting flexibility
 Crew enhancements 
 Enhanced ground checkout
 Western Test Range (Vandenberg)
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Pre-Challenger Accident (1983 – 1985)
Category Observation / Characteristics
S Of R dcope  
Development
• en ezvous
• Full Redesigned SM/PL Capabilities
• RMS Deploy and Retrieval
• Centaur Development
• Spacelab
• Main Engine Control redesign   
• Payload manifesting flexibility
• Crew enhancements
E h d d h k t• n ance  groun  c ec ou
• Western Test Range (Vandenberg)
• Reconfiguration tool planning / development
• Tools and procedures planning / development for DOD 
flights
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Pre-Challenger Accident (1983 – 1985)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Quality • Product Error Rate spikes to 2.8 DRs/KSLOC on OI-1 
(STS-7)
• Product Error Rate declines to 1.1 DRs/KSLOC by OI-7 
(STS-61C) similar to Release 19 (STS-5)     
• Verification Effectiveness in the range of 70 % to 80 % 
DRs found by SRR
• Pre-build Detection Effectiveness (Inspection Plus 
Development Test) increasing from 40 % to 65 %
• Percent of error present in the inspection materials 
found by the inspection
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Pre-Challenger Accident (1983 – 1985)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Reliability • Three Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) measures 
presented here.  
•Calendar Days Between Any Product DR
F 9 9 C l d D t 19 2 C l d D• rom .  a en ar ays o .  a en ar ays
• Flight Days Between Any In-flight DR
• From 12 3 Flight Days to 23 9 Flight Days .     .   
•Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR 
(Estimated)
• From 552 Flights to 1072 Flights
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Pre-Challenger Accident (1983 – 1985)
Category Observation / Characteristics
P d t DR Additi l 109 P d t DR i t d d OI 1 t OI 7ro uc  s • ona   ro uc  s n ro uce  on -  o -   
• Product DRs (unknown at the time) flown down to 322 
remaining at end of 1985 (24 % improvement over  
STS 5)-
• In-flight DRs for STS-6 to STS-51L 
• 147 Total Flight Days
• 8 DRs during flight (3 patched in-flight)
• Released Severity 1 DRs
• STS-6 to STS-51L flew with 6 Severity 1 DRs
• STS-41D aborted at T-6 seconds when GPC 
detected anomaly in orbiter's number three main 
engine. 
• Otherwise, would have flown with a 1 in 6 
chance of DR 56938, Data Homogeneity Issue, 
causing loss of crew and vehicle
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Pre-Challenger Accident (1983 – 1985)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Lessons            • Manual processes require continuous management 
Re-learned oversight to insure rigorous analysis
• All possible scenarios must be identified, 
accommodated via design, and tested.
M i l d bl h l• any scenar os re ate  pro ems ave extreme y 
small timing windows.  Very unlikely to detect during 
testing only.  Requires “Multi-Pass” analysis 
methods to insure identification   .
• Proper initialization under all scenarios required.
• Valid models in software test environment are critical
• Timing related hardware models need to include       
random variation similar to hardware characteristics
• Collect appropriate data during integrated hardware 
tests
• Multiple “apparently unrelated” software changes can 
collectively produce unexpected erroneous 
consequences
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Pre-Challenger Accident (1983 – 1985)
Category Observation / Characteristics
New Lessons • All possible scenarios must be identified  
Learned
     , 
accommodated via design, and tested.
• Failed hardware handling must be included in 
requirements
• Scenario analysis must include maximum ranges for 
parameters and variable precision must match
• Software Interface Control Document requirements 
must be verified in an end-to-end manner
• Two in-flight DRs due to failure to verify PASS SM 
to Spacelab ICD.  Both required in-flight patches 
h ff t i t b dw en e ec  on exper men s was o serve .
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Pre-Challenger Accident (1983 – 1985)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Staffing / Morale • The staffing was very experienced 
• One occasion when a task deemed “very easy”, a Co-
op was assigned to source ILOAD values.  Co-op failed to 
realize units conversion was required.  Released Severity 
1 DR resulted (DR 50788) but found in first run in SAIL.
• Morale was very high.
Fl i S Sh ttl iti• y ng pace u e was exc ng
• IBM was de-staffing the Space Shuttle project, but 
providing employment opportunities to all affected 
employees to projects either in Houston or other IBM         
facilities.
• Challenge to find and remove latent defects 
introduced earlier 
• Challenge to correct processes to avoid the 
introduction of additional Severity 1 DRs
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Shuttle/FSW Reconfiguration 
 STS-5 – STS-51L
 SM/PL tables redesigned to support payloads and to conserve 
space in order for there to be room in the GPC to fit the payload 
support
 Some of the SM/PL table layout now more complex and difficult to 
patch
 SM/PL Preprocessor was also redesigned for the new tables
 Auto I-Load processor
 Errors due to immaturity of tools and coding errors for late 
changes that didn’t go through preprocessor
Note (from 1986 NASA Excellence Award): 
 Elapsed time (and man hours) to reconfigure FSW was reduced to 
half (11 weeks to 5 weeks) by 1985
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Post-Challenger Return To,   
Flight (1986 to 1988)   
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Characteristics Of Period (1986 – 1988)
 Space Shuttle Challenger was lost with its crew on 01/28/1986.
 The next flight STS-26 was 09/28/1988  , ,   
 This time period focuses on the actions taken to achieve the return-to-flight on 
STS-26.
 Rigorous review of software requirements; numerous safety changes 
were identified and implemented on OI-8A and OI-8B 
 Action assigned to compute the probability of the loss of a shuttle and 
crew due to a PASS FSW error 
 PASS reliability calculations ignore the potential for the Backup Flight          
System (BFS) to safely engage
 While executing tasks to safely return the shuttle to flight, eight PASS 
Severity 1 DRs were discovered during this period in addition to two 
found in 1985.
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Characteristics Of Period (1986 – 1988)
 This was a very, very busy period, especially in 1988
 Completing special studies under the label “Revalidation”      
 Preparing for STS-26 flight including expanded Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 
Process
 Completing verification of OI-8C and development of OI-8D
 Preparing to resume transition to the AP-101S upgraded computer
 Transition to the AP-101S upgrade flight computer started prior to the 
Challenger accident (AP-101S required operating system changes)
 Development work was abandoned (OI-9, OI-10, OI-11)      
 Return-to-flight DRs were implemented on AP-101B systems (OI-8A, 
OI-8B, OI-8C, and OI-8D)
 AP-101S system software changes only were implemented on OI-8F 
(started at the end of this period)
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Characteristics Of Period (1986 – 1988)
 Infrastructure upgrades
 Significant changes to the ability to execute test in the Software           
Development Lab (SDF) / Software Production Lab (SPF)
 At the start of this period, there was one Flight Electronics Interface 
Device (FEID) that could run multi-computer runs by itself, and three 
FEIDs that could run single computer runs or be combined to run 
multi-computer runs
 At the end of this period, there were six FEIDs that could each run 
multi-computer runs
 Capacity to run test cases in the SDF and SPF increased by at 
least a factor of 3
 Thi i i ifi t t ib t t d ti i i fli ht DRs s a s gn can  con r u or o a re uc on n n- g  s 
compared to product DRs found on the ground in later 
periods
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Space Events (1986 to 1988)
 Voyager 2 Flyby of Uranus
 Challenger Accident (STS-51L)  
 Mir Launched
 Shuttle / Centaur canceled   
 Shuttle Vandenberg Launch Site canceled
 Shuttle Return to Flight (STS-26)    
 Only Buran Flight (Two Orbits)
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Post Challenger Accident (1986 – 1988)
Category Observation / Characteristics
S Of P t 51L S f t Chcope  
Development
• os -  a e y anges
• Bailout Capability
• Abort Enhancements
Category Observation / Characteristics
Quality • Product Error Rate declines 0.7 DRs/KSLOC on OI-8B 
(STS 26)-
• Product Error Rate continues to decline to 0.2 
DRs/KSLOC on OI-8C (STS-34) 
• Verification Effectiveness in the range of 60 % to 70 % 
DRs found by SRR (very few changes in highly critical 
areas)
• Pre-build Detection Effectiveness (Inspection Plus 
Development Test) increasing to near 80 % 
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Post Challenger Accident (1986 – 1988)
Category Observation / Characteristics
R li bilit Th fli ht i thi i d D t dde a y • ere were no g s n s per o .  a a a ress 
comparison from STS-51L in early 1986 to STS-26 in 
late 1988 
• Three Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) measures 
presented here.  
- Calendar Days Between Any Product DR
• From 19.2 Calendar Days to 28.6 Calendar 
Days
- Flight Days Between Any In-flight DR
From 23 9 Flight Da s to 89 6 Flight Da s•  .   y   .   y
- Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR
• From 1072 Flights to 1599 Flights
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Post Challenger Accident (1986 – 1988)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Product DRs • Additional 16 Product DRs introduced on                            
OI-7C/8A/8B/8C
• OI-7C/8A product DRs normally shown as from CI
Thi d t t f STS 26 SRR (1st ff OI 8B)• s a a coun s rom -   o  -
• Product DRs (unknown at the time) flown down to 240 
remaining at end of 1988    
• 43 % improvement over STS-5
• 24 % improvement over prior time period
• Released Severity 1 DRs
• 8 Severity 1 DRs identified and removed in this 
period
• No known Severity 1 DRs flown on STS-26 or any 
later flight
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Post Challenger Accident (1986 – 1988)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Lessons • Changes can have unintended consequences. Delta            
Re-learned
       
Test approach may miss.  Inspections best opportunity 
to detect.
• All possible scenarios must be identified, 
accommodated via design, and tested.
• Proper initialization under all scenarios required.
• Failed hardware handling must be included in 
requirements
Category Observation / Characteristics
New Lessons 
Learned
• Implement more vigorous scenario testing
• Need to audit requirements to code mapping
F il d h d h dli t b i l d d i• a e  ar ware an ng mus  e nc u e  n 
requirements
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Post Challenger Accident (1986 – 1988)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Staffing / Morale • De-staffing from early development levels completed in         
late 1985 just prior to Challenger accident
• Slight re-staffing occurred starting in mid 1986
• Improving morale with the low point the accident and 
the high point as of the STS-26 flight
• Staff very focused on flight software due to safety 
enhancements on STS-26 and other Revalidation tasks to 
improve flight safety
• Staff energized at the future opportunity to add 
functionality once development of OI-20 begins in1989 to 
k d f h i d d f hta e a vantage o  t e ncrease memory an  spee  o  t e     
AP-101S GPC
• Large backlog of new capabilities waiting to be 
implemented
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Shuttle/FSW Reconfiguration 
 STS-26
 STAR/MAST System development began around 1983, 
implemented/released post STS 51L (1986) and used in line to STS 26  -  ,      -
 Recon data now defined by inputs to the STAR/MAST systems
 STAR generates Level C for SM/PL and I-Loads
 MAST generates TFL/DFL/FPL  
 Ensures consistency across not only FSW but also ground facilities
 Better consistency checking for all users
A i h b tt h f id tifi ti li ny ssues ave e er c ance o  en ca on ear er
 STAR/MAST tools targeted to a “mature” vehicle fleet but an 
enormous number of modifications to the fleet resulted from the 
Challenger accident which in turn affected the tools’ audits.          
 Reduced staffing, resulting from the “improved” toolset, handicapped 
ability to provide timely software release updates.
 Resulted in numerous reworks early (STS-26 through STS-29)
 Offline tools were developed to augment the STAR/MAST tools 
(many of which are still in production today).
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Process Optimization and   
Stability Under IBM           
(1989 to 1993)
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Characteristics Of Period (1989 – 1993)
 This period is bounded by the STS-26 return-to-flight launch on 09/28/1988 at 
the beginning and ending with the sale of IBM Federal Systems Division to 
Loral Corp. effective January 1, 1994
 Also at the end of this period, the IBM Federal Systems Division Houston 
contract on Space Station Freedom software was terminated       .
 Quality of new development is maintained over this entire period at record low 
levels approaching 0.1 DR/KSLOC Product Error Rate.
 Available AP-101S memory and CPU speed result in major capability 
additions.
 Achievements in quality recognized in 1989 when NASA uses the PASS 
project for a “practice” CMM assessment
 C l d i ti d t CMM L l 5 (Hi h t ibl fi tonc u es organ za on assesse  a   eve   g es  poss e, rs  
ever)
 Starts an on-going collaboration with the Software Engineering Institute
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1989 CMM Level 5 Assessment
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1989 CMM Level 5 Assessment
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Characteristics Of Period (1989 – 1993)
 Workforce stable, includes flight software development subcontract with Loral 
Corp.
 Code produced by subcontractor is entered into pre-build Inspection 
Process the same as code developed by IBM employees
 Effective with OI-23 (1993), Loral conducts internal peer reviews on code 
prior to submission to IBM pre-build Inspections
 Processes matured & better documented with ISO9000 regular process team      ,    
meetings & formalized process change teams
 IBM negotiated a five year sole source extension of the contract to support 
PASS FSW development and maintenance starting in July, 1993.  Contract 
included provisions for gradually reducing the staffing level over the five 
years.
 Increasing flight rate with more complex missions
 First flight of upgraded AP-101S Computers
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Space Events (1989 to 1993)
 Voyager 2 Flyby of Neptune
 Magellan Launched to Venus (STS-30)    
 Galileo and Ulysses Launched to Jupiter (STS-34 & STS-41)
 Hubble Space Telescope Launched (STS-31)    
 Gamma Ray Observatory Launched (STS-37)
 Endeavour First Flight (STS-49)   
 First Hubble Repair Mission (STS-61)
 Last Dedicated Shuttle DOD Flight (STS-53)     
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CMM Lvl 5 Process Under IBM (1989 to 1993)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of • GPC Upgrade
Development • Extended Landing Site Table
• OPS 3 (TAL Code) in upper memory
• Redesigned Abort sequencer
2 Engine O t A to Contingenc Aborts•   u  u  y 
• OV-105 Hardware changes
• On-Orbit Changes
• MIR Docking 
• On-Orbit DAP Changes
Category Observation / Characteristics
Q lit P d t E R t t d i f 0 1 t 0 2ua y • ro uc  rror a e s ea y n range o  .  o .  
DRs/KSLOC 
• Verification Effectiveness steady in the range of 80 % to 90 
% DR f d b SRR s oun  y 
• Pre-build Detection Effectiveness (Inspection Plus 
Development Test) steady in the range of 80 % to 90 %.   
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CMM Lvl 5 Process Under IBM (1989 to 1993)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Reliability •Three Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) measures       
presented here.  
•Calendar Days Between Any Product DR     
• From 28.6 Calendar Days to 41.7 Calendar 
Days
• Flight Days Between Any In-flight DR
• From 89.6 Flight Days to 130.8 Flight Days
•Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR
• From 1599 Flights to 2335 Flights
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CMM Lvl 5 Process Under IBM (1989 to 1993)
Category Observation / Characteristics
P d t DR Additi l 22 P d t DR i t d d OI 8F th hro uc  s • ona   ro uc  s n ro uce  on -  roug  
OI-24
• Product DRs (unknown at the time) flown down to 140 
remaining at end of 1993
• 67 % improvement over STS-5
• 42 % improvement over prior time period
• In-flight DRs for STS-26 to STS-61 
• 291 Total Flight Days
• 1 DR during flight (introduced prior to STS-1)
• Released Severity 1 DRs
• 1 newly introduced released Severity 1 DR
• Found by IBM Flight Specific testing no flight     ,   
exposure
• No known Severity 1 DRs flown during this period
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CMM Lvl 5 Process Under IBM (1989 to 1993)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Lessons • All possible scenarios must be identified            
Re-learned
     , 
accommodated via design, and tested.
• Proper initialization under all scenarios required.
• Avoid using the same FSW variable for multiple        
requirements variables
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CMM Lvl 5 Process Under IBM (1989 to 1993) (cont’d)
Category Observation / Characteristics
New Lessons • Latent problems can remain in the FSW multiple years  
Learned
         
until scenario and hardware re-action timing align 
• Sequential inspections (e.g., development peer review 
followed by pre-build inspection) are equally effective in        
removing the same % of errors that exist at the start of 
the inspection.
• A single inspection removes about 55 % of errors
• Two sequential inspection each remove about 55 % 
of errors remaining at the start of the inspection.
• Collectively, they remove 80 % of the errors present 
at the first inspection.
Page 64
8/11/2010
CMM Lvl 5 Process Under IBM (1989 to 1993)
Category Observation / Characteristics
St ffi / M l M l hi ha ng  ora e • ora e very g ; 
• Staff very focused on flight software quality due to 
experiences during return-to-flight (1986 – 1988)
• With the AP 101S GPC upgrade major new  -   ,   
development during this period with large capabilities 
being implemented
• Organization recognized nationally and internationally     
for processes due to CMM Level 5 appraisal
• New contract work on the Space Station Freedom 
software (although the work would be terminated in late 
1993)
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Transition Period To Loral /     
Lockheed Martin               
(1994 to 1997)
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Characteristics Of Period (1994 – 1997)
 This period covers the time from transition from IBM to the time the project 
transitioned to United Space Alliance
 IBM Federal Systems Division sold to Loral Corporation as of January 1, 
1994
 On April 22, 1996, Lockheed Martin completed the acquisition of Loral 
Corporation's defense electronics and system integration businesses 
including the former IBM Federal Systems Division.
 USA and NASA signed the Space Flight Operations Contract in 
September 1996 to become the single prime contractor for the Space 
Sh ttlu e program.
 NASA intent was to transfer the PASS FSW contract work to USA at the 
completion of the five year contract signed in 1993.
 PASS FSW Contract work transition to USA on July 4, 1998.
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Characteristics Of Period (1994 – 1997)
 Late 1993 was not a good period for IBM Federal Systems in Houston
 Re-planning / transitioning from Space Station Freedom program to the          
International Space Station program
 IBM’s contract work on Space Station software would end in 1993
 IBM commercial divisions were struggling with revenues and profits as 
the mainframe era came to an end and the PC/server era evolved.
 To raise cash, IBM made a strategic decision to sell its space and 
defense businesses
 IBM Houston personnel were scattered    
 Remaining Space Shuttle work sold to Loral Corporation
 Many IBM Houston personnel either elected early retirement        
packages, transfer to other IBM projects and divisions, or voluntarily 
left for more promising job prospects outside of IBM.
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Characteristics Of Period (1994 – 1997)
 Leadership immediately following the transition to Loral was a morale plus
 Our initial Loral executive manager was Mike Coats       
 Tom Peterson, as PASS program manager, provided significant stability
 However it still was a traumatic period as 1993 ended,         
 Space Shuttle PASS project lost virtually all personnel with less than four 
years experience
 Other experienced personnel left the project
 One interesting exercise was merging the IBM and former Ford Aerospace 
subcontractor personnel into one new Loral organization.
 Morale within PASS FSW project began to deteriorate after the loss of Mike 
Coats in 1996 when Mike Coats become Vice President of Civil Space            
Programs for Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space in Sunnyvale, California. 
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Characteristics Of Period (1994 – 1997)
 Corporate level process improvement activities affecting the PASS Space 
Shuttle project became less focused after the Houston organization was re-
organized separate from other parts of the former IBM Federal Systems 
Division.
 As contract end approached and transition to United Space Alliance   ,       
approached in July, 2008, there was conflict based on the perception of 
attempts to prevent transition of the Space Shuttle PASS FSW contract to USA 
i d ith NASA ln accor ance w   p ans.
 Some personnel were extremely distracted throughout this period.
 M t tt t d i ti ti l h t t i lanagemen  a emp e  var ous mo va ona  approac es o re a n emp oyees.
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Space Events (1994 to 1997)
 7 Shuttle Flights in each year from CY1994 to CY1996
 8 Shuttle Flight in CY1997    
 Longest Duration Human Spaceflight Completed (438 Days)
 Shuttle / Mir Crew Exchanges Begin (STS-71)      
 Upgrades to Hubble Space Telescope (STS-82)
 Launch of Cassini Mission to Saturn     
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Loral / Lockheed Martin (1994 to 1997)
Category Observation / Characteristics
S Of Mi D ki Ad tcope  
Development
• r oc ng ap er
• On-Orbit DAP Changes
• 3 Engine Out Auto Contingency Aborts
• Ascent Performance Enhancements  
• Single-String GPS
Category Observation / Characteristics
Quality • Process escape on OI-25, Product Error Rate jump to 
0.8 DRs/KSLOC,  otherwise Product Error Rate steady 
in range of 0.1 to 0.2 DRs/KSLOC   
• Verification Effectiveness steady in the range of 60 % 
for OI-25, otherwise 85 % to 100 % DRs found by SRR
• Pre-build Detection Effectiveness (Inspection Plus 
Development Test) steady in the range of 75 % to 85 %.   
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Loral / Lockheed Martin (1994 to 1997)
Category Observation / Characteristics  
Reliability •Three Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) measures 
presented here.  
•Calendar Days Between Any Product DR
• From 41.7 Calendar Days to 54.0 Calendar 
Days
• Flight Days Between Any In-flight DR
F 130 8 Fli ht D t 119 3 Fli ht D• rom .  g  ays o .  g  ays
• Decrease due to In-flight DRs introduced on 
OI-25 during this period
•Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR
• From 2335 Flights to 3161 Flights
Page 73
8/11/2010
Loral / Lockheed Martin (1994 to 1997)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Product DRs • Additional 12 Product DRs introduced on OI- 25 through         
OI-27
• Product DRs (unknown at the time) flown down to 100 
i i t d f 1997rema n ng a  en  o  
• 76 % improvement over STS-5
• 29 % improvement over prior time period
• In-flight DRs for STS-60 to STS-87 
• 365 Total Flight Days
• 4 DRs during flight (2 introduced prior to STS-1,         
2 introduced on OI-25)
• Released Severity 1 DRs
• 1 newly introduced released Severity 1 DR
• Found by FSW Development, no flight exposure
• No known Severity 1 DRs flown during this period
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Loral / Lockheed Martin (1994 to 1997)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Lessons • It requires a 100 percent team effort, from executive            
Re-learned
         
management to every analyst, to achieve the quality 
levels that the PASS Space Shuttle project expects of 
itself.
• Without proper checks, a very few individuals can 
cause problems to escape that put the crew’s life at 
risk 
• Escapes also show up dramatically in quality 
measurements (such as what happened on OI-25 
with Product Error Rate).
All ibl i t b id tifi d•  poss e scenar os mus  e en e , 
accommodated via design, and tested.
• Proper initialization under all scenarios required.
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Loral / Lockheed Martin (1994 to 1997)
Category Observation / Characteristics
New Lessons • Essential to formalize management and lead analysts  
Learned
       
responsibility for assessing skills proficiency and work 
performance history for every individual on every team 
and evaluate risk based on skills mix with closed loop 
responsibility to program manager.
• Essential to put measurements in place and provide for 
proactive searches for “in process” symptoms (major       
actions with low team detection distribution; training 
pedigree; individual detection effectiveness; effects of 
multiple inspections) .
• Essential to have a method for confidentially reporting 
suspected deficiencies and process to respond to 
reports.
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Re-Inspection Criteria For D/C Inspections
• PASS FSW D/C Re-Inspection Criteria  (Maintenance Environment)
– The moderator will make a re-inspection decision for each module 
inspected without considering other modules in the package.
– For Design Inspections, re-inspection of a module is required if three or 
more major errors are found in the design. If fewer than three major 
design errors are found it is up to the moderator to decide if the module   ,            
should be re-inspected.
– For Code Inspections, re-inspection of a module is required if 10% or 
more non-comment lines have to be reworked, provided there are at least 
five lines to be reworked.  If less than 10% non-comment lines have to be 
reworked, it is up to the moderator to decide if the module will be re-
inspected.
A i ti i l i d if i b t i t d d–  re- nspec on s a so requ re   a compar son e ween nspec e  an  
final pool elements (or one of the other comparisons defined in Section 
5.3.4, “Pool Elements”) cannot be generated.
– For Design or Code Inspections re-inspect if 50% or more of the major    ,         
actions were found by one inspector only OR only one major action was 
found and only one inspector found it.
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Loral / Lockheed Martin (1994 to 1997)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Staffing / Morale • Morale was shattered repeatedly in this period        .
• Repeated staffing loses at each transition
• IBM to Loral
• Loral to Lockheed Martin
• Lockheed Martin to USA in July 1998
• Organization was caught up in the massive consolidation in 
the defense industry during this period
• Internal to the PASS FSW Project the OI-25 PTI DR’s served     ,      
as a call to action to renew our commitment to quality and safety.
• There is a uniformly accepted belief in the PASS project 
that the severity of a code error is independent of the 
i lpart cu ar error
• The same type of error in one situation can have very 
benign effects and yet in another case result in loss of 
crew/vehicle
• Consequences of the OI-25 PTI DRs could have been 
much worst.
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Transition to United Space    
Alliance (1998 to 2002)   
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Characteristics Of Period (1998 - 2002)
 This period focuses from transition of contract work to United Space Alliance 
on July 4, 1998 until the second shuttle accident involving loss of crew and 
vehicle (STS-107) on February 1, 2003
 Early 1998 was difficult as the time to transition to USA approached.
 NASA and United Space Alliance did everything in their power to make the 
transition smooth and as seamless as possible to employees.
 Once the contract transition was completed and employees were part of USA     ,      , 
there was a vast improvement in morale.   Employees were well treated by 
USA.   
 For some employees, there were significant advantages in that service 
under United Space Alliance was favorably treated under the Loral 
(including IBM earned service) and Lockheed retirement plans.  Possible 
to start retirement payments earned under IBM/Loral/Lockheed Martin 
while continuing to work for USA.
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Characteristics Of Period (1998 - 2002)
 NASA was focused on extending the life of the Space Shuttles to 2020
 Several major upgrades were in the process of being implemented          
including the Cockpit Avionics Upgrade
 In 2002, PASS FSW development resources began work on OI-41 which 
was to support the PASS changes necessary for Cockpit Avionics 
Upgrade
 Additional hiring for Cockpit Avionics Upgrade     
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Space Events (1998 – 2002)  
 Final Shuttle / Mir Mission (STS-91)
 Final Spacelab Mission (STS-90)   
 Beginning of ISS Construction (STS-88)
 Mir Deorbited 
 ISS Crew Increments Begin
 ISS U.S. Laboratory Destiny Added (STS-98)     
 Chandra X-Ray Observatory Launch (STS-93)
 First MEDS flight (STS-101)   
 First ISS Truss Element – S0 Added (STS-110)
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United Space Alliance (1998 to 2002)
Category Observation / Characteristics
S Of 3 St i GPScope  
Development
• - r ng 
• East Coast Abort Landing (ECAL) Automation
• Automatic Reboost
• GPC Payload Command Filter (GPCF)    
• Increased data to MEDS
• Start of Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU) builds
Category Observation / Characteristics
Quality • Product Error Rate steady in range of 0.1 to 0.2 
DRs/KSLOC 
• Verification Effectiveness steady in the range of 85 % to 
95 % DRs found by SRR
• Pre-build Detection Effectiveness (Inspection Plus 
Development Test) steady in the range of 85 % to 90 %.   
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United Space Alliance (1998 to 2002)
Category Observation / Characteristics  
Reliability •Three Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) measures 
presented here.  
•Calendar Days Between Any Product DR
• From 54.0 Calendar Days to 60.7 Calendar 
Days
• Flight Days Between Any In-flight DR
F 119 3 Fli ht D t 140 4 Fli ht D• rom .  g  ays o .  g  ays
•Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR
• From 3161 Flights to 3491 Flights     
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United Space Alliance (1998 to 2002)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Product DRs • Additional 8 Product DRs introduced on OI- 28 through 
OI-30
• Product DRs (unknown at the time) flown down to 39          
remaining at end of 2002
• 92 % improvement over STS-5
• 61 % improvement over prior time period
• In-flight DRs for STS-89 to STS-107 
• 675 Total Flight Days
• 2 DRs during flight (1 introduced prior to STS 1        - ,         
1 introduced on OI-28)
• Released Severity 1 DRs
• No newly introduced released Severity 1 DRs
• No known Severity 1 DRs flown during this period
Page 85
8/11/2010
United Space Alliance (1998 to 2002)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Lessons            • All possible scenarios must be identified, accommodated via 
Re-learned design, and tested.
• Failed hardware handling must be included in 
requirements
• Scenario analysis must include maximum ranges for       
parameters and variable precision must match
• Conservative planning for new capabilities is important.  Even 
if the capability is “really cool”.
• Recurrence of over committing relative to the skill        
capability of the team.  Strong desire to see the capability 
implemented was a significant contributor (e.g., “really 
cool”).
• Detected early and corrective actions put in place
• Separation of duties can enhance overall quality.  
• Requirements/development, development/project 
management, etc.
• USA / SEI Collaboration used multiple inspector data to assess 
the effectiveness of our re-inspection criteria compared to 
elaborate statistical methods.
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United Space Alliance (1998 to 2002)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Staffing / Morale • Significantly better.     
• People no longer concerned with whether they 
would be at the same company next year.  
•Excellent Senior Management
• Many senior managers were former astronauts 
or former flight directors
• People felt appreciated for skills and potential to 
contribute to United Space Alliance into the future
• Shuttle program to continue to 2020
• Pride in producing safe, high quality products
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Post-Columbia Accident , 
Return To Flight                 
(2003 to 2005)
Page 88
8/11/2010
Characteristics Of Period (2003 – 2005)
 Cockpit Avionics Upgrade began in 2002.   Continued until canceled late in 
2004.   Very large, major development activity with USA as prime for the 
development of hardware, software and integration.
 Major SAIL facility modifications required
 Major PASS FSW changes required
 Major support software (Application Tools) changes required
 Major FEID modifications required
 Space Shuttle Columbia and crew lost on February 1, 2003.
 OI development in this period limited to CAU which was large
 Non-CAU work limited to additional flight changes to OI-30 for return to 
flight
 No OI Development going on that would lead into a flight system.
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Characteristics Of Period (2003 – 2005)
 For Cockpit Avionics Upgrade software, a new “upgrades” organization was 
formed.
 Staffed in part by part time PASS personnel and by additional personnel 
hired specifically for CAU 
 Cockpit Avionics Upgrade making meaningful progress.  
 CAU requirements definition phase extended somewhat, with impact to 
development schedule  
 President Bush changed space policy as a result of the Columbia accident on 
January 14, 2004 
 Space Shuttle would end by 2010
 New exploration program which became Constellation
 CAU development terminated very late in 2004 after three years of effort.
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Space Events (2003 to 2005)
 Loss of Columbia (STS-107)
 2-Man ISS Increments  
 Messenger Launch to Mercury
 Mars Rovers Spirit / Opportunity Launched     
 First Chinese Manned Spaceflight
 Shuttle Return to Flight (STS-114)    
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Post-Columbia, Return To Flight (2003 to 2005)
Category Observation / Characteristics
S Of L t f CAU b ildcope  
Development
• as  o   u s
• Enhanced ADI / HSI capability
Category Observation / Characteristics
Quality • No active development for production Operational 
Increments
• Some activity changes on flight systems but no separate         
quality measures (included into OI-30 measurements).
• No objective data on CAU quality due to termination of 
program prior to verification start    
• Focus on CAU and other return-to-flight activities 
continued to identify and remove latent errors in the PASS 
system
• Nearly 50 % of remaining latent product DRs were 
discovered during this period between flight.
• Significant increases in PASS software reliability
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Post-Columbia, Return To Flight (2003 to 2005)
Category Observation / Characteristics  
Reliability •Three Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) measures 
presented here.  
•Calendar Days Between Any Product DR
• From 60.7 Calendar Days to 75.2 Calendar 
Days
• Flight Days Between Any In-flight DR
F 140 4 Fli ht D t 235 3 Fli ht D• rom .  g  ays o .  g  ays
•Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR
• From 3491 Flights to 4212 Flights     
Page 93
8/11/2010
Post-Columbia, Return To Flight (2003 to 2005)
Category Observation / Characteristics
P d t DR N P d t DR i t d d d i thi i dro uc  s • o ro uc  s n ro uce  ur ng s per o
• Development effort was focused on changes in 
support of the Cockpit Avionics Upgrade project, 
which was canceled   
• Product DRs (unknown at the time) flown down to 20 
remaining at end of 2005    
• 95 % improvement over STS-5
• 49 % improvement over prior time period
• Released Severity 1 DRs
• No newly introduced released Severity 1 DRs
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Post-Columbia, Return To Flight (2003 to 2005)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Lessons • CAU re taught us that new projects (which it really was)            
Re-learned
 -          
are not the same as maintenance projects
• Challenge to teach this lesson to new persons or 
new project managers based on prior projects       
rather than learning it fresh on each project. 
Category Observation / Characteristics
New Lessons • None
Learned
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Post-Columbia, Return To Flight (2003 to 2005)
Category Observation / Characteristics
St ffi / M l E t d l hit f ll i th C l bi id ta ng  ora e • xpec e  mora e  o ow ng e o um a acc en
• Morale recovered as work continued on CAU and 
return-to-flight changes for STS-114
• Moral slightly impacted by new space policy including        
end of shuttle in 2010
• Offset by opportunity for new work on Constellation
• Overall moral relatively good with focus on return-to-,       
flight
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Shuttle To End In 2010 OI    ,  
Development Continuing  
(2006 – 2008)
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Characteristics Of Period (2006 - 2008)
 Focus on flying shuttle missions and maintaining the critical skills to provide 
mission support and to resolve any issues in a timely manner
 Three OI’s developed in this period (OI-32, OI-33, and OI-34)
 OI content driven in differing directions by different forces
 Large content desired from a skill maintenance perspective
 Selected customer constituents advocating specific changes
 Flight Operations and others wanting to minimize content so as to 
minimize the cost of stepping up to an OI in a declining budget 
environment 
 Orion (CEV) contract awarded to Lockheed Martin on August 31, 2006.
 Moderately small but significant flight software simulation software and ,    ,  ,  
CAIL (CEV Avionics Integration Laboratory) subcontract awarded to USA for 
support by the USA Flight Software Element.
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Characteristics Of Period (2006 - 2008)
 To insure continued process quality and efficiency, complete a CMMI 
appraisal in November 2006; assessed at CMMI Level 5 
 Generally, content size getting small and getting smaller.  OI implementation 
of change instruments sometime assigned across multiple teams just to 
spread the exposure to code and process      .
 After return-to-flight, there were a number of space shuttle program level 
technical issues that constraint the flight rate during this entire period as 
solutions were found to the technical issues
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Space Events (2006 – 2008)
 Launch of New Horizons to Pluto
 Completion of ISS U S Segment (STS-120)   . .  
 Completion of ISS Truss Segments (STS-119)
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OI Development Continuing (2006 – 2008)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of • Lambert Guidance Improvements  
Development
  
• 6x Traj display redesign
• Entry and Ascent Bearing Display additions
• RTLS ET Sep improvements   
• Entry Remote Controlled Orbiter (RCO) Capability
• Elimination of old user notes and DRs
• Reduction in Horizontal Sit display code size
• Year End Roll Over (YERO) 
Category Observation / Characteristics
Quality • Product Error Rate steady in range of 0 0 to 0 1       .   .  
DRs/KSLOC 
• Verification Effectiveness steady in the range of 95% to 
100% DR f d b SRR s oun  y 
• Pre-build Detection Effectiveness (Inspection Plus 
Development Test) steady in the range of 80% to 100%.   
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OI Development Continuing (2006 – 2008)
Category Observation / Characteristics  
Reliability •Three Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) measures 
presented here.  
•Calendar Days Between Any Product DR
• From 75.2 Calendar Days to 88.1 Calendar 
Days
• Flight Days Between Any In-flight DR
F 235 3 Fli ht D t 275 5 Fli ht D• rom .  g  ays o .  g  ays
•Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR
• From 4212 Flights to 4930 Flights     
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OI Development Continuing (2006 – 2008)
Category Observation / Characteristics
P d t DR Additi l 1 P d t DR i t d dro uc  s • ona   ro uc  s n ro uce  on                            
OI- 32 through OI-34.
• Product DRs (unknown at the time) flown down to 2          
remaining at end of 2005
• 99 % improvement over STS-5
• 90 % improvement over prior time period      
• In-flight DRs for STS-114 to STS-126 
• 162 Total Flight Days
• 1 DR during flight (1 introduced on OI-33)
• Released Severity 1 DRs
• No newly introduced released Severity 1 DRs
• No known Severity 1 DRs flown during this period
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OI Development Continuing (2006 – 2008)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Lessons            • Ever present risk to “stumble” into maintenance traps once the 
i t t i i t d d i t th ftRe-learned ma n enance rap s n ro uce  n o e so ware
• Hardware constraint required data for output transactions 
to be located on “full word” (32 bit) boundary
• Programming Standard put in place to require HAL/S 
compiler technique to always rigorously enforce “full 
word” boundary
• Standard exception coded in one software module which 
required manual validation  
• Comments in code module described the exception
• Due to series of events, the comments and code locations 
were separated
• Unrelated change made on OI-33 which shifted data, 
resulting in a break in an existing capability
• Model fidelity in simulations, lab anomalies, and failure to 
execute scenarios resulted in error escaping to flight       . 
• Automated PASS software capabilities did not work in 
flight; required ground controllers to perform manual 
workarounds.
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OI Development Continuing (2006 – 2008)
Category Observation / Characteristics
New Lessons • None  
Learned
Category Observation / Characteristics
Staffing / Morale • Negatively impacts morale  
• Decision to cancel CAU 
Count down to the end of shuttle program puts future•           
employment at risk
• Quite a bit of uncertainty
• Positively impacts morale  
• CEV (Orion) subcontract provides hope for 
continued employment at the end of shuttle program
• Steady space shuttle missions provide sense of       
accomplishment
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Shuttle To End Delayed    
Slightly, Skill Maintenance   
(2009 – 2011)
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Characteristics Of Period (2009 - 2011)
 Space Shuttle end targeted for October, 2010
 8 shuttle flights in 14 months provide a focus which distracts from the             
approaching end of shuttle through STS-132 (May 2010)
 Focus on executing training activities to maintain critical skills in place of 
production OI work in prior period
 President Obama administration announced new space policy on January 27, 
2010 which would extend International Space Station operations through at          
least 2020 but abandon NASA's current plans to return U.S. astronauts to the 
moon.
 Payload issues and ISS traffic constraints result in slipping last space shuttle 
flight ending in March 2011
 L l b t fli hteaves arge gaps e ween g s
 May 2010 to Nov 2010, Nov 2010 to Feb 2011
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Characteristics Of Period (2009 - 2011)
 To insure continued process quality and efficiency, complete a second CMMI 
appraisal in September 2009; assessed at CMMI Level 5 
 Uncertainty of fate of Constellation projects such as CEV (Orion)
 Uncertainty over the NASA authorization language that will be law for 2011
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Space Events (2009 – 2011)
 Six Person ISS Resident Crew Capability
 Completion of Primary ISS Construction (STS-130)     
 ATV / HTV first flights
 Last Hubble Space Telescope Repair Mission (STS-125)      
 End of Shuttle Program – 2011? (STS-135?)
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Skill Maintenance (2009 – 2011)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Scope Of • No active development for production Operational Increments; 
Development minor flight systems changes
Category Observation / Characteristics
Quality • No active development for production Operational Increments
• Minor flight systems changes, inadequate size of changes to 
establish meaningful metrics.
Category Observation / Characteristics
Reliability •Three Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) measures 
presented here. 
Calendar Da s Bet een An Prod ct DR•  y  w  y u  
• From 88.1 Calendar Days to 94.0 Calendar 
Days
• Flight Days Between Any In-flight DR     
• From 275.5 Flight Days to 293.9 Flight Days
•Shuttle Flights Between Severity 1 PASS DR
• From 4930 Flights to 6260 Flights
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Skill Maintenance (2009 – 2011)
Category Observation / Characteristics
P d t DR N dditi l P d t DR i t d d d i thi i dro uc  s • o a ona  ro uc  s n ro uce  ur ng s per o
• Product DRs (unknown at the time) flown down to 0 
remaining as of July 2010   , 
• In-flight DRs for STS-119 to STS-132 (as of 05/2010) 
• 114 Total Flight Days   
• 0 DRs during flight
• Released Severity 1 DRs
• No newly introduced released Severity 1 DRs
• No known Severity 1 DRs flown during this period
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Skill Maintenance (2009 – 2011)
Category Observation / Characteristics
Lessons • None            
Re-learned
Category Observation / Characteristics
New Lessons 
Learned
• None
Category Observation / Characteristics
Staffing / Morale • Positive effect on morale
Hi h fli ht t t M 2010 f li h t• g  g  ra e o ay , sense o  accomp s men
• Personnel engaged in value add skill development 
projects
• Shuttle continuing to fly slightly longer     
• Potential that CEV Orion project will continue to be funded
• Negative effect on morale
• Unemployment rapidly approaching
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Summary
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Contributors To PASS FSW High Quality
Contributor To PASS FSW High Quality Context
Multiple releases and multiple iterations of 
testing prior to STS 1
Delays in launch date due to TPS and SSME issues 
provided more testing time and more opportunities to fix   - .          
identified problems.
Fully automated Flight-to-Flight 
Reconfiguration Process and Tools
Early flights had a number of System Management in 
flight failures due to late manual updates.
Structured “PASS Revalidation” activities 
between Challenger accident and STS-26
Direct contributor to eliminating Severity 1 (Loss of 
crew/vehicle) DRs from PASS
Continual enhancements of the 
Requirements/Design/Code/Test Inspection
• Have appropriate participation in each type of 
inspection including external community participation  
Processes
    
• Having appropriate re-inspection criteria
Adequate test facility functionality and capacity 
(equipment to execute cases on flight 
equivalent hardware)
Significant improvement in in-flight reliability between 
STS-51L and STS-26 during a period when test facility 
capacity increased by a factor of 3       .
Defined criteria for selection of personnel for 
teams; define how to resist over commitment 
of critical skills.
Critical skills management has always been a priority. 
Re-enforced by action From OI-25 PTI DRs where team 
skill and over commitment were contributing factors.
Rigorous configuration management of all 
products including requirements, design, code, 
and tests.
Basic necessary condition
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Space Shuttle Flight Software Periods
Years Theme Summary
1978-1982 Initial System 
De elopment
Tremendous accomplishment with quality level of  about 1 product  error / 
KSLOC Excellent in flight software reliability in this period Howeverv .         .  , 
still resulted in 424 DRs flown (unknown at the time) on STS-5 including 3 
Severity 1 DRs (loss of crew/vehicle)  in contingency abort scenarios.
1983-1985 Pre-Challenger 
Operations
Product error/KSLOC increased for early OI releases.  Flight to flight 
reconfiguration late updates were manual, resulting in several in flight 
DRs.  Additional DRs due to failure to test PASS to Spacelab interface.  
Abort due to SSME failure on STS-41D prevented launch with Severity 1 
DR with probability of occurring of 1 in 6.
1986-1988 Post-Challenger, Return 
to Flight
Very productive period with an emphasis on safety and quality.   Product 
error rate reduced to 0.2 errors/KSLOC.    STS-26 flew with only 240 DRs 
(unknown at the time), a significant reduction from STS-5.   All Severity 1 
DR id tifi d d d i t STS 26 I fli ht ft li bilits en e  an  remove  pr or o - .   n g  so ware re a y 
increased by a factor of 10 over STS-5.  Preparation in work to step up to 
upgraded General Purpose Computer AP-101S. 
1989-1993 Process Optimization and 
Stability
Recognized as CMM Level 5.  Implemented GPC Memory/Speed Upgrade 
and added major new capabilities. Product error rate reduced to 0.2 
errors/KSLOC Skilled Stable Workforce STS-61 flew with 140 DRs. ,  .       
(unknown at the time).  Only one in flight DR over 291 flight days.
1994-1997 Transition To Loral / 
Lockheed Martin 
Significant work force distractions during acquisitions affecting the PASS 
project .  Notable process escape on OI-25.  Excluding OI-25, continued  
to achieve Product error rate of 0.2 errors/KSLOC.  Continued reduction 
in latent  DRs being flown to 100 DRs (unknown at the time).
1998-2002 Transition to United 
Space Alliance
Restore Workforce Stability / Influx Of New Personnel. Product error rate 
of 0.2 errors/KSLOC. Continued reduction in latent  DRs being flown to 39 
DRs (unknown at the time). In flight software reliability increased by a 
factor of 15 over STS-5. 
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Space Shuttle Flight Software Periods
Years Theme Summary
2003-2005 Post-Columbia / Return-
To Flight
Activities included Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (later canceled),  Columbia 
Accident and Return to Flight No OI development in this period that-  ,     .         
went to flight systems. Continued reduction in latent  DRs being flown to 
20 DRs (unknown at the time). 
2006-2008 Shuttle Ending, OI 
Development 
Continued development of OI-32, OI-33, and OI-34. Assessed as CMMI 
Level 5 November 2006. Product error rate of  0 to 0.1 errors/KSLOC. 
Continued reduction in latent  DRs being flown to 2 DRs (unknown at the 
time). 
2009-2011 Shuttle Ending, Skill 
Maintenance
Continued training activities for Skill Maintenance.  SAIL to one shift 
operations and other Reductions-In-Workforce.   As of this presentation, 
there had been no DRs discovered, including latent DRs, since the first 
flight of OI-34.
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Wrap-up
 This presentation has shown the accomplishments of the PASS 
project over three decades and highlighted the lessons learned.
 Over the entire time, our goal has been to 
 Continuously improve our process
 Implement automation for both quality and increased productivity       
 Identify and remove all defects due to prior execution of a flawed 
process in addition to improving our processes following 
identification of significant process escapes    
 Morale and workforce instability have been issues, most significantly 
during 1993 to 1998 (period of consolidation in aerospace industry)
 The PASS project has also consulted with others, including the 
Software Engineering Institute, so as to be an early evaluator, adopter, 
and adapter of state-of-the-art software engineering innovations
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Acronyms
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Acronyms
Acronym
ADI Attitude Direction Indicator
ALT Approach and Landing Test
AP-101B Initial flight computer for Space Shuttle; 104 K 32-bit full works of 
Memory
AP-101S Upgrade flight computer for Space Shuttle; 256 K 32-bit full words
of Memory (256K 32-bit FWs = 1MB 8-bit bytes).
ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle
CAIL CEV Avionics Integration Lab
CAU Cockpit Avionics Upgrade
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle  
CI Configuration Inspection
CM Configuration Management
CMM Capability Maturity Model
CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integrated
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Acronyms
Acronym
CPU Central Processing Unit
DAP Digital Auto Pilot
DOD Department of Defense
DR, DRs Discrepancy Report(s)  
ECAL East Coast Abort Landing
ET External Tank
FSW Fli ht S ftg  o ware
GPC General Purpose Computer
GPCF GPC Payload Command Filter 
GPS Global Positioning System
HIS Horizontal Situation Indicator
HTV H-II Transfer Vehicle  
ICD Interface Control Document
KSC Kennedy Space Center
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Acronyms
Acronym
KLSOC 1000 Non-Comment Source Lines of Code (new, changed, and 
d l t d)e e e
MEDS Multifunction Electronic Display System
MIR Name of the Russian Space Station
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OFT Orbital Flight Test  
OI Operational Increment
OPS Operational Sequences
OV Orbiter Vehicle
PTI Program Test Input
RCO Remotely Controlled Orbiter
RMS Remote Manipulator System
RTLS Return-To-Launch-Site
Page 121
8/11/2010
Acronyms
Acronym
RTLS Return-To-Launch-Site
SAIL Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
SASCB Shuttle Avionics Software Control Board
SEI Software Engineering Institute  
SM Systems Management
SM/PL Systems Management/Payload
SMS Sh ttl Mi i Si l tu e ss on mu a or
SRR Software Readiness Review, typically 4 weeks prior to flight
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
STS Space Transportation System
TAL Transoceanic Abort Landing
TPS Thermal Protection System  
Traj Trajectory
YERO Year End Roll Over
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